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An increase in the probability of work abroad, where the returns to schooling are higher 
than at home, induces more individuals in a developing country to acquire education, 
which leads to an increase in the supply of educated workers in the domestic labor 
market. Where there is a sticky wage-rate, the demand for labor at home will be constant. 
With a rising supply and constant demand, the rate of unemployment of educated 
workers in the domestic labor market will increase. Thus, the prospect of employment 
abroad causes involuntary “educated unemployment” at home. A government that is 
concerned about “educated unemployment” and might therefore be expected to 
encourage unemployed educated people to migrate will nevertheless, under certain 
conditions, elect to restrict the extent of the migration of educated individuals. 
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It is disheartening to witness unemployment, and it is particularly worrisome to have 
educated workers left idle when human capital is scarce who could, if employed, help 
significantly to pull a developing country out of poverty. A policy-maker who seeks to 
curb unemployment has to address three issues: the labor market attributes of the 
unemployed; the reasons for their being unemployed; and the effective policy response. 
Since the third of these issues depends on resolving the first and second, we have 
sought in our earlier work to characterize the unemployed, and to identify the root 
causes of unemployment. In Fan and Stark (2007a) we showed how the prospect of 
international migration from a developing country can entail “educated 
unemployment” in that country: when the expected returns to investment in education 
(skill acquisition) increase, as when workers face a positive probability, 0p > , of 
working in a richer, technologically advanced country where the returns to human 
capital are higher than in the home country, workers find it optimal to acquire more 
human capital. If a worker fails, however, to secure highly-paid employment abroad, 
an event occurring with probability (1 ) 0p− > , he may well elect to hold back on 
getting a job in his country of origin if this enables him to try again for more 
highly-paid employment. This suggests to us that “educated unemployment” could be a 
voluntary adjustment to the introduction of the prospect of working abroad.  
 
In the range of possible measures to combat unemployment, one of the remedies 
most frequently considered is improving the skills and professional qualifications of 
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the unemployed; but this is not going to be much help when there is already a pool of 
unemployed who are educated and skilled. “Educated unemployment” is a notable 
labor market feature in many developing countries. In their influential textbook on 
Development Economics, Gillis et al. (1996) allude to the Sri Lankan experience as a 
striking example, noting that in the 1970s, half of the country’s new university 
graduates were unemployed. Boudarbat (2006) reports that in 2000 the unemployment 
rate of university graduates in Morocco was about four times that of individuals who 
had had less than six years of schooling.
1
 A 2007 Arab Labor Organization (ALO) 
report, quoted in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Masri al-Yawm, notes that “the trend of 
higher unemployment among literates applies to countries throughout the Arab world, 
with a ratio of 5:1 in Morocco and 3:1 in Algeria,” and that in Egypt, “the rate of 





The phenomenon of educated unemployment in developing countries contrasts 
with the pattern of unemployment in developed countries. In the latter, the 
unemployment rate and educational attainment are strongly negatively correlated 
(Ashenfelter and Ham, 1979). The causes of “educated unemployment” in developing 
countries have attracted relatively little attention in the development economics 
literature. Early and recent exceptions, respectively, are Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), 
and Fan and Stark (2007a). Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) construct a model with labor 
market rigidities in which the wage rate of educated workers is fixed. They argue that 
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by affecting people’s psychology, a high wage rate for educated workers in a foreign 
country can prompt an increase in the fixed wage rate of the educated in the home 
country. A higher fixed wage leads to increased unemployment. In the model of 
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), unemployment is involuntary. And as already noted, in 
a job-search framework, Fan and Stark (2007a) established a causal analytical 
relationship between the probability of international migration from a developing 
country and “educated unemployment” in that country. In that research, unemployment 
is voluntary.  
     
As early as the 1980s, the argument that “educated unemployment” and 
international migration are closely linked attracted the attention of policy-related 
researchers who were concerned about the causal relationship between the two. Reading 
some of that research is quite telling. King (1987), who studied the brain drain and 
educated unemployment in the Philippines, noted (p. 101): “In the case of the 
Philippines, however, a very high demand for college education has accompanied high 
rates of unemployment and underemployment and generally low real wages. Data on 
immigration ... reflect how the demand for education has been heavily influenced and 
encouraged by expected rates of return from employment in overseas labour markets.” 
Tullao (1982), who studied the problem of unemployed nurses in the Philippines, stated 
(p. 45): “The demand for nursing education in the Philippines is influenced significantly 
by international migration. The private profitability of investing in nursing education is 
greatly increased when the probability of emigration is included in the investment 
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calculus. Filipinos would not demand nursing education in the light of low wages and 
limited employment opportunities in the domestic market as reflected in the low rate of 
return to nursing education without migration.” A related interesting observation is that 
“educated unemployment” appears to have pervaded developing countries in which the 
official language is English (such as the Philippines, India, and Bangladesh in Asia 
(Muta, 1990)), or French (the former French colonies in Africa (Zoctizoum, 1980)). 
Education acquired in these countries is relatively readily transferable to the developed 
world, making skilled migration viable. Consequently, these countries have 
simultaneously experienced a discernible brain drain and “educated unemployment.” 
 
In the current paper we show how “educated unemployment” is exacerbated by the 
prospect of international migration. Our study of the link between the prospect of 
migration and unemployment in a fixed-wage framework complements Fan and Stark 
(2007a), suggesting that the prospect of migration from a developing country could 
entail both voluntary and involuntary unemployment in that country. An increase in the 
probability of working abroad, where the returns to schooling are higher than at home, 
encourages more individuals in a developing country to acquire education, which leads 
to an increase in the supply of educated workers in the domestic labor market. Where 
there is a sticky wage-rate, the demand for labor at home is constant. With a rising 
supply and constant demand, the rate of unemployment of educated workers in the 
domestic labor market increases. Thus, the prospect of employment abroad causes 
involuntary “educated unemployment” at home.   
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Whereas Fan and Stark (2007a) studied “educated unemployment” in a job search 
setting without invoking the assumption of an imperfect labor market, the current 
paper investigates “educated unemployment” drawing on the perception that quite 
often the market for educated labor does not clear because the going wage for educated 
workers is higher than that which would equate labor demand with labor supply. The 
assumption of a fixed or sticky wage is central to Keynesian economics, and is 
supported by considerable empirical evidence (see, for example, the survey by Romer, 
2006). Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) argue that there is an additional important reason 
for the existence of a fixed or sticky wage in the modern sectors of developing 
countries: “The presence of international income-inequality implies that, for the 
educated elite which is better informed about the developed world, and more integrated 
therewith regarding notions of a ‘good life’ and related values, the salary level 
demanded and fixed by the elite groups themselves tends to reflect the salary levels of 
comparable groups in the more developed countries … Thus, we can postulate a 
socio-economic situation in which the real wage levels of the educated elites are set by 
fiat, legislation, unionization, etc., at levels which reflect the degree of response to the 
international-elite-integration effect…” (Bhagwati and Hamada 1974, pp. 20-21). The 
argument of Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) can be interpreted further upon application 
of the “fair wage” theory of Akerlof and Yellen (1990): the 
“international-elite-integration effect” tends to increase the “fair wage” demanded by 




The usefulness of this extension goes beyond merely demonstrating that the causal 
relationship between the prospect of migration and unemployment reported in our 
earlier work is not model-specific; whether unemployment is voluntary or involuntary 
obviously matters for the design of public policy (Romer, 2006): as already noted, the 
efficacy of policies to alleviate unemployment is not independent of the reasons for 
that unemployment. We contend that a sticky-wage model portrays accurately a reality 
in which, as considerable empirical and policy-related research has suggested, a great 
many university graduates compete for relatively few jobs in the economy’s public 
sector, where the wage rate is fixed. We show that the prospect of migration can 
exacerbate an already prevailing mismatch between the supply of, and demand for 
skills. And we spell out a corresponding policy response.  
 
The considerations and behavior of the government are studied closely. If the 
government is not concerned about the problem of unemployment, we show that it will 
not implement any measure to restrict the migration of skilled individuals. If the 
government is concerned about the problem of unemployment, however, we show that 
under certain conditions, it will actually restrict the migration of skilled individuals. 
 
2. A model of involuntary “uneducated unemployment” 
Consider a world that consists of two countries: a home country, H, and a foreign 
country, F. Country H is developing and is poorer than developed country F. In H, there 





An individual can be either skilled or unskilled. If an individual chooses to become 
skilled, he has to incur the cost of education, which is constant at the level c.  
 
In the economy of the home country, there is a single good that can be produced 
by constant-returns-to-scale technologies. One technology is a “modern” production 
technology. We assume that this technology is human capital (or skilled labor) 
intensive. The other technology is “traditional” production technology. We assume that 
this technology is physical (or unskilled) labor intensive. For the sake of simplicity, we 
further assume that the only production input in the modern sector is skilled labor, 
while the only production input in the traditional sector is unskilled labor. 
 
Specifically, the production function that is based on the traditional technology is 
described by 
 
  ( ) uuu LLGY Φ≡= , (1) 





 are the output and the unskilled labor force of the traditional sector, 
respectively
4
, and 0Φ >  is a constant. In a competitive economy, the wage rate of an 
unskilled worker is equal to his marginal product, namely to Φ . 
  





















are the output and the skilled labor force of the modern sector, 
respectively. While the modern sector is also competitive, we assume that due to an 
institutional rigidity in the labor market for skilled workers, the wage rate of skilled 
workers is fixed. We denote this wage by . Naturally, we assume that Φ>Ω . Thus, 
the number of skilled workers who are employed in the home country, which we 
denote by , is determined by the standard condition 
 
  ( ) Ω=Γ′F . (3) 
   
Let the skilled individuals in the home country face a prospect of working in the 
foreign country. The wage rate in the foreign country for a skilled worker is denoted by  
f
w . To reflect the facts that the foreign country is developed (technologically 
advanced) and the home country is poorer, we assume that fw > Ω . Due to a policy of 
selective migration by F, it is only educated (skilled) individuals from H who have a 
chance to work in and hence migrate to F.
5
 We denote the probability of being selected 
into work in F by p, where 10 << p  is a constant. 
 
Let the total number of skilled individuals remaining in H (an endogenously 
determined variable) be denoted by N. The unemployment rate of the educated 










≡ 1 . (4) 
   
Let the (lifetime) earnings of an educated unemployed individual be normalized at 
zero.
6
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pw p u c
 + − − Ω + − 
= + − − Ω −
 (5) 
   
We make two additional assumptions:  
 
  ( ) Φ>−Ω−+ cppw f 1 ; (6) 
   
  ( )[ ] Φ<−′ LpF 1 , (7) 
   
where L denotes the total pre-migration number of individuals in H. The meaning of (6) 
is that absent unemployment, not all individuals will work in the traditional sector. The 
meaning of (7) is that absent unemployment, not all individuals work in the modern 
sector. Clearly, (6) will be satisfied if fw  and  (the wage rates of the skilled) are 
sufficiently larger than Φ  (the wage rate of the unskilled), and (7) will be satisfied for 
a sufficiently large L and when p has an upper limit.  
 
We now show that together, (6) and (7) entail “educated unemployment.”  
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Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose the reverse, namely that 0=u . 
Upon inserting 0=u  into (5) we see, recalling (6), that all the individuals in H will 
choose to be skilled. Yet, if all the individuals in H so choose, the number of skilled 
individuals in H after migration occurs will be Lp)1( − , that is, if 0=u , then 
Lp)1( −=Γ . However, from (7) it follows that in such a case the marginal product of 
a skilled worker will be less than , which in turn implies that the wage rate  cannot 
clear the labor market of skilled workers, although recalling (3), it has to. This results 
in a contradiction.  
 
Having shown that 0>u , we insert (4) into (5) and rewrite the expected net 
earnings of a skilled individual as  
 





Ω−+ 1 . (8) 
   
Recalling the assumption that the individuals are risk neutral, we know that the 
number of individuals who choose to acquire education is determined by  
 





f 1 . (9) 
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Proof. Totally differentiating (9) with respect to p and N, and rearranging, we get that 
 
  























Proposition 1 shows that an increase in the probability of working abroad leads to 
an increase in the number of skilled individuals remaining in the home country. 
Interestingly, although a sticky wage in the skilled labor market limits employment 
opportunities in the skilled sector, the increase in the number of skilled individuals 
remaining in the home country can nonetheless benefit the country in the long run.
8
 
For example, considerable empirical evidence indicates that the educational attainment 
of children is closely related to the educational level of their parents.
9
 Thus, this paper 
points to a possible new source of a “brain gain,” complementing the gains identified 
in Stark et al. (1997, 1998), and Stark and Wang (2002). 
 
We next show that an increase in the probability of working abroad increases the 
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The intuition underlying Proposition 2 is as follows. An increase in the probability 
of working abroad induces more individuals to acquire education, which leads to an 
increase in the supply of skilled workers in the domestic labor market. Due to a sticky 
wage rate, the demand for skilled workers is constant. Thus, an increase in the 
probability of working abroad increases the unemployment rate of skilled (educated) 
workers in the domestic labor market.  
3. Government intervention  
Since in our model unemployment is caused by the sticky wage in the skilled labor 
market and hence is involuntary, the call for government intervention is quite obvious. 
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It is noteworthy that in this vein, the current paper differs substantially from the 
framework in Fan and Stark (2007a) where unemployment is completely voluntary. It 
is a semi-consensus (macro) economics that a government intervention is warranted if 
and only if the market does not function efficiently, as when this malfunctioning is due 




Let us define the government’s objective function as follows:  
 





















This specification means that the government rejoices when the number of 
individuals who receive education and remain the home country increases, and that it 
laments when the rate of unemployment increases. In this section, as in the received 
literature (Stark and Wang, 2002), the choice variable of the government is “p.” 
Clearly, and for example, because of migration restrictions in the foreign country, 
it is unrealistic to assume that all the skilled individuals migrate. We denote the 
maximum level of p that the home country faces by 1p < . Also, the case where the 
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optimal solution is 0=p  is clearly of limited interest. Thus, we might just as well 
assume that 0=p  is never the optimal solution for the government. But then the 
optimal solution of the government, which we denote by *p , is obtained by solving 




















with strict equality holding if pp <* . Namely, if (14) holds with strict inequality, then 
the optimal solution of the government problem is the corner solution, pp =* . Then, 
we first have the following proposition. 
 





























From Proposition 1, we know that 0>
dp
dN
. Recalling the first part of (13), we know 
that (15) will always hold with strict inequality. Thus, in this case, we have that 




What Proposition 3 implies is that had the government not been concerned about 
the problem of unemployment, it would not have implemented any measure to restrict 
the migration of skilled individuals.  
 
We next consider the more applicable case in which the government does care 







. Recalling (11), 









= . (16) 
 


























































   

















   
We insert pp =  into (19) and (20), and then we insert (19) and (20) into (18). If 
in this case (18) holds, then pp =  is the optimal solution; otherwise, pp =  is not 
the optimal solution. We sum up the preceding analysis in the form of a proposition. 
 


















Proposition 4 implies that if the government is concerned about the problem of 
unemployment then, given some reasonable conditions, it will restrict the migration of 
skilled individuals. Clearly, the more the government is concerned about the problem 





, the more likely 
condition (21) will hold, and hence the more likely the government will restrict 
migration. This implication is in contrast with the conventional wisdom that a 
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government that is confronted by the problem of “educated unemployment” should 
encourage skilled individuals to migrate. Our analysis suggests that adherence to this 
conventional wisdom will result in more individuals choosing to acquire advanced 
education, which will only exacerbate the problem of “educated unemployment.” 
 
4. Conclusion 
“Educated unemployment” is a pronounced phenomenon in many developing countries. 
We developed a simple model aimed at shedding further light on the causes of this 
phenomenon. Our model consists of three essential ingredients: multiple sectors of 
production, sticky wages in the modern sector, and international migration. Due to the 
stickiness of the wage rate for skilled workers, the number of skilled workers who are 
employed in the modern sector may be lower than the number of skilled workers in the 
economy. Our analysis raises the possibility that when a developing economy opens up 
to the migration of its skilled workers, the resulting equilibrium number of idle skilled 
(educated) workers could well be exacerbated by the prospect of international 
migration. Furthermore, we analyzed the government’s policy landscape. We showed 
that if the government is not concerned about the problem of unemployment, it will not 
take steps to restrict the migration of skilled individuals. However, if the government 
cares about unemployment, then under some certain conditions it will end up 
restricting the migration of skilled individuals. 
The causal relationship between the state of the labor market in the country of 
origin (for example experiencing unemployment) and migration from the country is 
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well researched. It is usually argued in the received literature that the direction of the 
causality is from unemployment at origin, to migration from origin. The causal 
relationship established in this paper between the prospect of migration and the state of 
the labor market in the country of origin (such as it experiencing unemployment), with 
causality running from the prospect of migration from origin to unemployment at 
origin, is relatively little researched, yet warrants close attention, especially empirical 
scrutiny. In policy-related research, it is often asserted that opening an economy to the 
migration of its skilled workers when there is skilled unemployment at home could 
help remedy a wasteful underutilization of human capital. Our paper raises the 
possibility of a bleaker, opposite outcome. Moreover, the mechanism that we have 
depicted suggests, for example, that when a government opens its economy to 
migration, it needs simultaneously to improve the efficiency of the labor market.
11
 
Without such an improvement, the response of skilled workers to the prospect of 
migration could well exacerbate unemployment in the educated workforce.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, we employed the simplest model to highlight the 
essential points of interest. In follow-up research, the perspectives delineated and 
developed in this paper can be further extended in several directions. For example, our 
analysis is presented in a static framework. If we were to extend the model to a 
dynamic framework, then it would be necessary to model the government in a setting 
in which it faces a “time-consistency” constraint of the Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
type: when the probability of working abroad is lower, fewer individuals will choose to 
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acquire education, which will result in a lower rate of “educated unemployment.” 
However, the government may be tempted to allow more educated individuals to 
migrate to further reduce the problem of educated unemployment. Yet doing so will 
result in the government losing “reputation” since in future periods, individuals in the 
country will believe that the government will allow maximal migration of educated 
individuals, which will invalidate the policy of migration control in reducing educated 
unemployment. Also, our model considered only the policy instrument of migration 
control. An alternative policy instrument is to “unstuck” (lower) the sticky wage. This 
can be quite difficult. To this end, we would need to fully study and understand the 
political, social, and economic procedures and costs of reducing the level of sticky 
wages, say those of civil servants. This foray aimed at unraveling another route for 
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1
 In a fascinating account of the labor market of Kerala, Mathew (1997) reports that in 
1983, the unemployment rate of university graduates in urban Kerala was 11.34 
percent for males and 25.69 percent for females, which is much higher than the 
unemployment rate of those who had no education (3.52 percent for males, and 1.52 
percent for females), and the unemployment rate of those who had up to primary 
education (6.73 percent for males, and 8.43 percent for females). 
2
 See http://en.rian.ru/world/20070802/70181395.html. 
3
 We could, as in Stark and Wang (2002), extend the model to allow for heterogeneity 
in workers’ ability to acquire skills. However, such an extension will not change the 
essence of our argument. 
4
 We could have considered a case wherein production in the modern sector involves 
not only skilled workers but also fixed inputs such as capital and infrastructure. 
However, we would assume then that the owner of the fixed inputs is either the 
government, or is absent. 
5
 Such a selective migration policy appears to have been implemented, and 
increasingly more strictly. For example, in May 2006, the lower house of the French 
parliament passed a selective migration law that allows entry into France of only 
skilled workers. See also Jasso and Rosenzweig (2009).  
6
 As in any fixed-wage model, unemployment is a short-run phenomenon. In the long 
run, we assume that every unemployed educated individual will take a job in the 
traditional sector and receive the unskilled wage rate. For notational convenience, 
however, we might just as well normalize such an individual’s total lifetime income at 
zero. 
7
 Conceptually, we may imagine that an educated individual participates in two 
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consecutive lotteries after acquiring education: the first lottery is the lottery of working 
in F. The probability of a successful draw in this lottery is p. The second lottery is the 
lottery of being employed in the modern sector in H. The probability of a “successful” 
draw in this lottery is the product of two probabilities, (1-p) and /N. (See also (8) 
below.) 
8
Fan and Stark (2007b) make a similar point in a different context in which an increase 
in the average level of human capital of the last generation can facilitate a “take off” of 
the economy in the current generation. 
9
Hanushek (1996) and de la Croix and Michel (2002) provide comprehensive surveys 
of the empirical literature. Fan and Stark (2008) present a theoretical analysis of the 
intergenerational transmission of human capital that is related to parental human 
capital. 
10
 For example, see the survey in Romer (2006). 
11
 For example, to the extent that the public sector is part of the modern sector, the 
government will need to revise the wage set there. Interestingly, if one reason for the 
wage in the public sector being set high is to induce workers to acquire education, the 
opening of the economy to international migration by educated workers could act as a 
substitute for the public sector wage-setting incentive.   
